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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
4 
THE STATE OF UTAH, • • 
Plaintiff-Respondent, . • 
-v- • Case No. 18314 • 
CHARLES T. BROWN, • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated 
kidnapping. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged with forcible sexual abuse and 
aggravated kidnapping. He was tried before a jury in the 
Second District Court on January 20, 1982, the Honorable Duffy 
Palmer, Judge, presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction in 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 16, 1981, Gale Kuki went to her mother's 
house in Logan to pick up her granddaughter. Dan Thompson, 
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Ms. Kuki's neighbor, accompanied her (T. 26). They arrived at 
Ms. Kuki's mother's house around five to six o'clock, p.m. (T. 
26). Charles Brown, appellant in the instant case, called Ms. 
Kuki several times while she was at her mother's home. He 
wanted to know when she was going to return (T. 26) and told 
her he was coming with a gun (T. 27). 
Mr. Brown and Ms. Kuki had been having an affair for 
the last two and one-half to three years (T. 25). They met at 
Hill Air Force Base, where they both worked (T. 39). Mr. 
Brown told Ms. Kuki he would be getting a divorce as soon as 
his wife graduated from college. Ms. Kuki told him she did 
not care whether he got a divorce or not (T. 41, 44). She had 
decided she wanted to end the relationship (T. 85). 
Ms. Kuki and Mr. Thompson left Logan between ten and 
twelve o'clock p.m. (T. 27). Ms. Kuki took Mr. Thompson home. 
While Ms. Kuki was at Mr. Thompson's residence, the appellant 
called her several times and asked if he could come over. Ms. 
Kuki told him he could (T. 27). When he arrived, the 
appellant told Mr. Thompson that "if he didn't quit foolin' 
around" he was going to slit his throat (T. 28}. Ms. Kuki 
left after awhile to get some cigarettes at a nearby store. 
On her way there, she was stopped by a policeman for drunk 
driving (T. 28). The policeman finally allowed her to leave. 
She returned home and was met there shortly by appellant (T. 
28). 
-2-
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Ms. Kuki had started to fix the appellant a drink 
when he began to wrestle with her. They argued about nan 
Thompson (T. 30), whom Ms. Kuki thought of as a friend (T. 
2G). M::;. Kuki then told appellant she was tired and wanted to 
go to bed. She went into her bedroom, shut the door, and 
locked it. She got into bed with her clothes still on and 
covered up (T. 31). 
Appellant broke the doorknob off, came in, and 
started slapping Ms. Kuki and beating her face. He then drug 
her by her hair and arms to the front room (T. 31). He threw 
her on the couch and ripped off her blouse and bra. Appellant 
began biting Ms. Kuki on her face, eyes, the back of her ears, 
her back, and breasts (T. 31). Ms. Kuki tried to escape by 
diverting appellant's attention and running next door to her 
neighbor's, Mr. Brown's home. She went inside, but he was not 
there. Appellant caught up with her and began ripping her 
hair out by the roots (T. 34). At trial, the neighbor 
testified that he found a wad of chestnut brown hair on the 
floor of his home (T. 100). 
Appellant continued to hit her. Ms. Kuki once again 
eluded appellant. She ran outside. Appellant caught her and 
drug her back in the house. He threw her under the kitchen 
table and started biting and kicking her again (T. 35). 
Ms. Kuki managed to rip appellant's shirt (T. 36), 
but she could not fight back (T. 38). No one answered her 
screams. Sometime during the beating, appellant told Ms. Kuki 
he was going to torture her before he killed her (T. 68). 
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Ms. Kuki got away from appellant once more and ran 
to the phone. She called her mother (T. 36). Ms. Kuki told 
her mother that she was in trouble. She asked her mother to 
come over, or, if she had not arrived at her mother's house in 
a little while, to call the authorities (T. 90). 
When appellant caught up with her this time, she 
handed him the phone and he began talking to her mother (T. 
36). While he was so occupied, she took the opportunity to 
run from her home to her van (T. 36,37). She was able to lock 
the doors before he could reach her, although he pounded on 
the hood of the van before she drove away (T. 37). 
Ms. Kuki drove directly to her mother's home. Her 
mother told her to call the police, which she did upon 
returning to her home (T. 37). The incident had lasted about 
four hours (T. 33). 
Ms. Kuki was badly injured by the beating. One eye 
was completely shut and the other was going shut. Her nose, 
lips, and the back of her head were swollen. The appellant 
had tried to bite her ear off (T. 89). Her lip was split and 
scraped underneath. Large lumps behind both ears were 
bruised; the bruises extending down the side of her neck. 
Both arms were also bruised. She suffered several scrapes 
across her chest (T. 122). Her mother testified that her 
daughter was so badly bitten, she thought she had been stabbed 
(T. 91). 
Officer Dean Bell of the Layton City Police 
Department later arrested appellant and advised him of his 
-4-
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rights (T. 113). Appellant admitted at that time that he had 
bitten Ms. Kuki (T. 116). 
Appellant claimed that.he had been bitten on the lip 
and that his shoulder was pulled out of joint (T. 117). 
Oficer Bell, however, saw no bruises, scratches, or lip wound, 
and he sat close to appellant for approximately one hour (T. 
117, 120). He saw no injuries at all on appellant (T. 117). 
Furthermore he observed that appellant was in no pain in 
taking his shirt off and putting it back on (T. 117). 
Ms. Kuki was interviewed and examined by the police 
department shortly after the incident. Virginia Johnson, a 
secretary for the Layton Police Department (T. 121), took 
photographs of Ms. Kuki in the nude, since the male police 
officers were unable to do this (T. 121). The photographs 
were presented as evidence at trial (T. 123). When asked by 
the prosecutor if the pictures accurately portrayed what she 
personally witnessed, Ms. Johnson answered, "Well, they 
appeared worse in person than they do in pictures. They were 
dark bruises • • • • They don't show any tenderness, of 
course, that she, you know, she was in a lot of pain when she 
moved. But other than that, they are pretty close " (T. 124). 
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the 
photographs, claiming they were irrelevant, did not accurately 
depict the observations of Ms. Johnson, and any value was 
outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant (T. 129). The 
photos were admitted into evidence. 
-5-
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At trial, appellant claimed that Ms. Kuki had 
started the fight (T. 158) and that his arm popped out of 
socket when he tried to grab her (T. 159). He maintained that 
~ 
she started squeezing his arm and that his only defense to 
this behavior was biting her (T. 163). The appellant 
admitted, however, that he might have threatened her (T. 177). 
Appellant requested the court to give jury 
instructions on assault and self-defense. The court denied 
both requests (T. 106). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO SELF-DEFENSE. 
Appellant requested a jury instruction on 
self-defense. This request was denied. Appellant now 
contends that the failure to so instruct the jury was improper 
because the evidence warranted the instruction. 
The rule for when a self-defense instruction is 
required was given in State v. Castillo, Utah, 457 P.2d 618, 
619 (1968): 
If the defendant's evidence, although in 
material conflict with the State's proof, 
be such that the jury may entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to whether or not he 
acted in self-defense, he is entitled to 
have the jury instructed fully and clearly 
on the law of self-defense. Conversely, 
if all reasonable men must conclude that 
the evidence is so slight as to be 
incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in 
the jury's mind as to whether a defendant 
-6-
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accused of a crime acted in self-defense 
. , 
tendered instructions thereon are properly 
refused. 
Sta~~---y-~_ Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947); and 
Castillo, supra, further require that the evidence be 
substantial before this instruction is justified. 
When these rules are applied to the instant case, it 
is clear that appellant was not entitled to a self-defense 
instruction. The evidence supporting such a theory is so 
slight that it could not possibly raise a reasonable doubt in 
the jury's mind. 
The only evidence supporting appellant's contention 
is his own self-serving testimony. All other evidence 
contradicts appellant's assertion. The victim's testimony 
indicates that appellant was indeed the aggressor. Her 
testimony was corroborated by the testimony of her mother, 
Pauline Dinsdale. The best evidence that shows that appellant 
was not acting in self-defense, however, was the physical 
states of both parties after the incident was over. The 
victim, who was the supposed aggressor who put the appellant 
in fear of bodily harm, was severely injured. Her eyes were 
swollen shut. Her nose, lips, and the back of her head were 
swollen. Large lumps behind both of her ears appeared and 
were bruised, the bruises extending down the side of her neck. 
Both arms were bruised and her chest was scraped (T. 89, 122). 
She was so severely injured that her mother thought she had 
been stabbed (T. 91). 
-7-
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Although appellant claimed that the victim started 
squeezing his arm after it popped out of socket and slapped 
and pushed him, the investigating officer saw no evidence of 
pain or injury (T. 117). Officer Bell spent an hour with 
appellant (T. 117) and saw no bruises, scratches, or wound. 
Appellant was in no pain from the alleged injured shoulder. 
If the victim were really as aggressive as appellant 
makes her out to be, and had actually "tried to tear [his] arm 
off" (T. 163), appellant would have been in a considerable 
amount of pain. His arm would have necessarily shown signs of 
the struggle, for it takes no small amount of force to twist 
someone's arm off, or to even twist it to the extent necessary 
to give that person an idea of the aggressor's intent. 
It is true that the victim tried to defend herself 
from appellant by striking him, but her actions were futile. 
Appellant now tries to manipulate these defensive actions into 
appearing to be threatening to him. If appellant had to 
defend himself, there is no evidence of a force that he had to 
defend himself from. 
According to State v. Romero, 385 P.2d 967, 970 
(N.M. 1963): 
In order to justify an instruction on 
self-defense, there must be evidence of an 
actual attempt or offer to do bodily harm, 
or the accused must have had reasonable 
ground to apprehend a design or the 
prosecutor's part to commit a felony on 
him, or to do some great bodily harm, and 
that there was imminent danger to him of 
such design being accomplished. 6 C.J.S. 
Assault and Battery § 92, pp. 944-945. 
-8-
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In the instant case, the victim did not try to harm appellant 
other than to try and protect herself by striking back at him 
when she was able. She was unsuccessful in her efforts. Her 
-~ 
actions could not have been perceived as attempts to do bodily 
harm, and appellant was certainly in no imminent danger of her 
accomplishing such a design. Appellant was never threatened 
by the victim and had nothing to fear from her. 
Appellant admits to biting and hitting the victim 
(T. 163). He also admits to threatening her (T. 177). The 
remaining evidence points to defendant's guilt rather than 
bolstering his claim of innocence. Therefore, the evidence 
could not be considered to substantially support appellant's 
contention that he acted in self-defense. 
The Court thus acted properly in refusing his 
request. As this Court stated in State v. Talarico, 57 Utah 
229, 234, 139 P. 860, 861 (1920): 
••• While the theory of counsel, 
persistently and strenuously urged, was 
that of self-defense, it was nevertheless 
all theory and no evidence, all shadow and 
no substance. 
This statement can be appropriately applied to the instant 
case. 
Furthermore, even if the appellant were using force 
in self-defense, the force he used was clearly excessive. 
According to Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-402: 
A person is justified in threatening or 
using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes 
that such force is necessary to defend 
-9-
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himself or a third person against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force; 
however, a person is justified in using 
force which is intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he 
reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or a third 
person, or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
In the instant case, it would certainly not take 
appellant four hours to subdue the victim. It would not 
require him to bite her and hit her to the point that she 
appeared to have been stabbed. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the victim provoked the 
argument, appellant's actions in response could only be 
regarded as retaliatory rather than defensive. The fact that 
a small woman strikes a large man does not justify him in 
brutally beating her. Smith v. Wickard, 85 N.E. 1030 (Ind. 
App. 1908). 
The assault must not have gone beyond what was 
reasonably brought on by the provocative acts and if more 
force is used than is necessary to repel the assault, then it 
is unjustified. Reber v. Sandoz, 63 So.2d 876, (La. App. 
1953)~ 
Therefore, even if the victim had provoked the 
incident, as appellant claims, he was still properly charged 
and convicted of Aggravated Kidnapping. Any self-defense 
instruction given to the jury would have had to be accompanied 
by another one explaining the amount of force that may be 
used. Such an instruction was mentioned in State v. Woods, 563 
-10-
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p.2d 1061 (Kan. 1977). The instruction stated that a person 
may lawfully use only such force as may reasonably seem 
necessary to him in defending himself against unlawful attack 
and serious bodily harm, and that a person may not go further 
than appears reasonably necessary for such defense. 
Even if appellant had been entitled to a 
self-defense instruction and the jury had been given one, the 
results of the trial would have been the same. In the first 
place, the jury would not have believed appellant's 
self-serving testimony that he had to beat and bite a woman 
for hours to defend himself. Secondly, if the jury found that 
he had been acting in self-defense initially, it would have 
concluded that he quickly became the aggressor and exceeded 
the force necessary to protect himself. 
This Court has held that: 
Whenever this court believes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error in not 
giving the instruction would not have 
affected the verdict, the case should not 
be reversed. State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 
P.2d 949 (1975); State v. Scandrett, 24 
Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970). 
Since the result in the instant case would have been the same 
even if a self-defense instruction had have been given, the 
conviction should be affirmed. Any error that may have 
occurred was harmless. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF ASSAULT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING. 
Appellant argues that assault is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated kidnapping. He maintains that an 
assault instruction should have therefore been given to the 
jury. 
The rule of law which defines what constitutes a 
lesser included offense was given in State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 
2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962): 
The rule as to when one offense is 
included in another is that the greater 
offense includes a lesser one when 
establishment of the greater would 
necessarily include proof of all of the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when the proof of 
the lesser offense requires some element 
not involved in the greater offense that 
the lesser would not be an included 
offense. (Citation omitted.) 
See also State v. Cross, Utah, 649 P.2d 72 (1982); and State 
v. Elliott, Utah, 641 P.2d 122 (1982). 
The foregoing rule is also set forth in Utah Code 
Ann., 1953 (as amended), § 76-l-402(3)(a), which provides that 
one may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged when: 
It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all of the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged •••• 
-12-
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. ~ 
Appellant contends that all of the elements of the greater 
crime are necessarily included in this lesser crime. He cites 
State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175 (1976) for the 
proposition that when this occurs, a lesser included offense 
jury instruction should be given. 
When the statute is applied to the instant case, 
however, it appears that the offense of assault is not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping since it is 
indeed possible to commit an aggravated kidnapping without 
committing assault. This is clear from a comparison of the 
respective elements of the two offenses. According to Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-5-102, 1953 (as amended), elements of assault 
include: 
1) an attempt 
2) with unlawful force or violence 
3) to do bodily injury to another 
or 
1) a threat 
2) accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence 
3) to do bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-302, 1953 (as amended) sets forth the 
elements of aggravated kidnapping: 
1) intentionally or knowingly 
2) by force, threat, or deceit 
3) detains or restrains another against 
his will 
4) with intent to 
a) hold for ransom or reward, or 
b) facilitate the commissioner ••• 
of a felony • • • , or 
c) inflict bodily injury or to 
terrorize the victim or another, 
or 
d) interfere with the performance of 
any governmental or political 
function. 
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It can be easily demonstrated that assault is not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping. The assault 
statute contains elements which were not required to be proven 
. 
in order to obtain a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
Therefore, no lesser offense instruction is required. See 
State v. Williams, Utah, 636 P.2d 1092 (1981). 
First, an aggravated kidnapping does not necessarily 
require attempted bodily harm. A kidnapper may detain his 
victim without ever attempting physical violence. He may, for 
example, detain through deceit. Furthermore, assault requires 
an attempt to do bodily injury to the victim. Aggravated 
kidnapping, on the other hand, is expanded to read harm done 
to the victim or another. 
Second, an aggravated kidnapping does not require a 
threat. The kidnapping may be accomplished through deceit, as 
noted above. Even if a threat is involved, however, assault 
requires the threat to be accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence. Aggravated kidnapping requires only a 
threat. 
It is evident that assault is not a lesser included 
offense of aggravated kidnapping since the kidnapping can be 
performed without resorting to either of the two main elements 
of assault. Appellant in essence admits this by stating, "it 
would be almost impossible to sustain a conviction of 
aggravated kidnapping without also proving all of the elements 
of assault." (Appellant's Brief, p. 9, emphasis added). As 
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long as the possibility of sustaining a conviction of 
aggravated kidnapping exists without simultaneously proving 
assault, assault cannot be considered a lesser included 
. 
offense of aggravated kidnapping. 
The Court in People v. Hobson, 396 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1979) held that aggravated assault is not a lesser 
included offense of aggravated kidnapping. While the Illinois 
statutes are somewhat different from Utah's, the Court's 
reasoning behind this decision is applicable to the instant 
case. The Court stated that an individual can kidnap an 
individual while armed without necessarily putting the victim 
in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery through the 
use of a deadly weapon. Consequently, it is possible to 
commit the offense of aggravated kidnapping without committing 
assault and the latter is, as a result, not a lesser included 
offense of the former. 
Assault is not a lesser included offense because 
aggravated kidnapping may be proven without proving assault. 
Conversely, an assault may be committed that is unrelated to 
any of the elements of aggravated kidnapping. Therefore, 
appellant's argument is without merit. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM INTO EVIDENCE. 
Virginia Johnson, secretary of the Layton Police 
Chief, took photographs of the victim in the nude so that the 
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full extent of her injuries could be recorded. Ms. Johnson 
viewed these photographs after they were developed (T. 125). 
They were then checked out of evidence and enlarged by the 
4 
County Attorney (T. 127). 
Mr. McGuire asked Ms. Johnson whether the pictures 
accurately portrayed the victim's condition or that occasion. 
Ms. Kuki replied: "Yes, they, they don't show the tenderness, 
of course, that she, you know, she was in a lot of pain when 
she moved. But other than that, they are pretty close" (T. 
124, lines 12-14). 
Mr. Besendorfer further questioned Ms. Johnson about 
the pictures: 
Q. And I believe you also stated that 
now you were asked if these accurately 
depicted how you observed her at that 
particular time and you said no; is that 
correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay, you said that there was a 
difference between these photographs and 
how she looked? 
A. She appeared. The bruises were darker 
and you can't depict in a picture, 
tenderness, you know. 
Q. Okay, but physically, are they 
different from how you observed her? 
A. Not too much, I wouldn't say. 
Q. Okay, not too much, but some? 
A. Right. I don't believe they show to 
the degree that she's injured. 
(T. 126, lines 16-29). 
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Appellant objected to the admission of the 
photographs into evidence, claiming that they did not 
accurately depict the situation (T. 130). 
The Court overruled the objection, stating that 
"[t]he motion is not well taken, the exhibits may be received" 
(T. 131). 
It is clear from the transcript that the photographs 
accurately portray the victim's condition. The only 
difference Ms. Johnson noted between the pictures and the 
victim's condition was that the pictures could not convey the 
degree of pain that the victim was in. 
Appellant maintains, however, that the photos did 
not accurately depict the photographer's observations. He 
claims that this violates the general rule that before a 
photograph can be admitted into evidence, its accuracy and 
correctness must be proved. Landrum v. Taylor, 536 P.2d 406 
(Kan. 1975). 
Appellant can support his contention only by taking 
Ms. Johnson's words out of context. He points out only that 
Ms. Johnson stated that the photos did not accurately depict 
what she observed, that they differed somewhat. He does not 
mention the fact that Ms. Johnson clarified her statement. 
Ms. Johnson was concerned that the jurors would not 
observe the tenderness of the victim's bruises or the 
intensity of pain that the victim was in. Photographs cannot 
convey these impressions. The photos, however, depicted Ms. 
Johnson's observations as accurately as is possible in a 
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photograph. This slight differentiation does not detract from 
the admissibility of the photographs. Film which is a 
~ubstantiallv accurate and correct representation of relevant 
- # 
facts observed is admissible. Lavler v. Industrial 
Commission, 537 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. App. 1975). 
The prosecution laid a proper foundation for the 
photographs in this case. He asked the witness her name and 
place of employment, whether she took those particular 
photographs, and whether they accurately portrayed the victim 
(T. 123, 124). The witness answered all of the questions to 
the Court's satisfaction, and the Court properly admitted the 
photos into evidence. 
Ordinarily, the question of admissibility of 
photographic evidence rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Landrum, supra. The trial court's ruling will 
be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Hansel v. Ford 
Motor Co., 473 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. Wash. 1970). Appellant has 
not and cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion 
on this issue. It properly admitted into evidence photographs 
of the victim which were taken shortly after the incident. 
Appellant also argues that Ms. Johnson made value 
judgments of the photographs. Appellant does not state what 
these value judgments might be, but goes on to say that these 
so-called value judgments undermine the purpose behind the 
authentication requirements. 
Appellant's conclusion on the nature of value 
judgments (if indeed there were any) are contrary to the Utah 
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Rules of Evidence. Rule 56 states that a nonexpert witness 
may give opinions or inference if the judge finds they are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are 
nelpfu~ co a clear understanding.of his testimony or to the 
determination of the fact in issue. If opinion testimony is 
allowed under these conditions, it could certainly not be 
construed as undermining the purpose behind the authentication 
requirements; the opinion testimony is a help rather than a 
hindrance in such a situation, since it clarifies the facts in 
issue. 
In the instant case, Ms. Johnson's opinions were 
both (a) rationally based on her perceptions and (b) helpful 
to a clear understanding of her testimony. These statements 
helped to authenticate the pictures that Ms. Johnson took. 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the trial court should be affirmed 
because appellant received a fair trial at that time. There 
was inadequate evidence to justify a jury instruction on 
self-defense. Even if the instruction had been given, the 
verdict would have remained the same. 
Appellant was not entitled to an instruction or 
assault because assault is not a lesser included offense of 
aggravated kidnapping. It is possible to commit an aggravated 
kidnapping without committing assault, making the instruction 
inapplicable. 
Appellant's contention that the photographs should 
not have been admitted is particularly weak. The pictures 
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accurately portrayed the victim. Their only limitation was 
that they could not show the considerable amount of pain that 
tl-1~ -,.1~ ,-t- i!"n suffered. The photographs were therefore properly 
admitted into evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of August, 
1983. 
DAVID W. WILKINSON 
Att°jjJf;a~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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